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Frans N. Stokman Wijbrandt H. van Schuur
Leadership Dimensions Among Developing Nations
in the United Nations
1. Object of the Study and Theoretical Framework1
This paper contains an analysis of historical trends in group cohesion and leader¬
ship among developing nations within the United Nations General Assembly over
the 1950's and 1960's. This study has several theoretical aspects.
For the developing nations the 1950's and 1960*s were the transitional period
from the colonial to the neo-colonial era, in which they created their own group-
and negotiation structures to cope with their new Situation. Within the United
Nations the Afro-Asian countries started consultations in 1949 on an ad hoc basis;
regulär caucus meetings of this group began in 1955 after the Bandung Conference.
In the 1950's Afro-Asian group formation was primarily focussed on problems of
political independence and political non-alignment. Because of their remote interest
in these problems, Latin American countries did not participate in these groups. In¬
stead, they continued to hold their own regulär caucus meetings as they had from
the beginning of the United Nations. However, faced with the basic problems of
economic dependence and development the politicaUy independent Afro-Asian and
Latin American countries began to realize that they had in the early sixties a com¬
mon interest in a new policy for international trade and development. This led to
the formation in 1963 of the „Group of 77", in which they would coordinate their
policies in the Second (economic) Committee of the General Assembly and the
UNCTAD Conferences.
The fifth session (1950) was chosen as our first year of analysis, because one can
hardly speak of an Afro-Asian group before that year (Tadic, 1969). This group is
This paper is one of the publications of a research project on legislative behavior at the Insti¬
tute for Political Science of the University of Amsterdam. A more extensive publication on
Third World group formation in the United Nations is forthcoming (Stokman, Frans N., RoU
Calls and Sponsorship. A methodological analysis of Third World group formation in the United
Nations, Leyden 1977). Prof. Dr. P. R. Baehr and Prof. Dr. R. J. Mokken of the Institute for
Political Science of the University of Amsterdam were involved in this project on Third World
group formation from its very beginning. In all phases of the study they provided valuable ad¬
vice.
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the most important subgroup we analyzed within the whole group of developing
nations. By the time of the Korean war the Afro-Asian states realized that a war
between the great powers might well be waged in Asia. This strongly stimulated
Afro-Asian group formation and the predominantly Afro-Asian non-alignment
movement.
The 23rd session (1968) was the last session studied, because the General As¬
sembly Official Records of later sessions were not yet available in the Netherlands
at the time the material for this study was collected. Given our research aims, the
23rd session is sufficiently recent, because the first years of Cooperation of the de¬
veloping nations in the ,,Group of 77" are thus incorporated in our period of
analysis.
The research period is divided into four periods:
5th - lOth session (1950-55)
llth- 14th session (1956-59)
15th - 18th session (1960-63)
20th - 23rd session (196Ö-68)2
We chose this particular division for several reasons. Within the different penods
membership of the United Nations was relatively stable, whereas the differences
between the periods are maximized in this respect. Moreover, the division roughly
corresponds to generally observed and reported developments in group formation
among the developing nations — in particular among the Afro-Asian nations — both
inside and outside the United Nations.
At the end of the lOth session a large number of new members were able to
enter the United Nations as the result of a „package deal" between the United
States and the Soviet Union in the Security Council. For the developments in the
Afro-Asian group a split between 1954 and 1955 might have been more preferable
In the spring of 1955 Afro-Asian group formation was strongly stimulated at the
Bandung Conference. From that time on, the Afro-Asian delegations at the United
Nations met in regulär caucus, the so-called Asian-African caucusing group.
At the beginning of the 15th session a large number of newly independent Afn-
can States entered the United Nations en bloc. This drastically changed the relative
strength of this group of states within both the Afro-Asian group and the United
Nations as a whole. The Asian-African caucusing group was renamed Afro-Asian
group and developments in Africa came to the fore.
The main reason for the division between the third and fourth period is the for¬
mation of the „Group of 77" at the 1963 session. Can we discover differences in
leadership and group cohesion before and after the formation of this group and be¬
fore and after the experiences at the first UNCTAD-conference at Geneva in 1964?
In the 19th session no votes were taken in the General Assembly in order to prevent Suspen¬
sion of the voting rights of the Soviet Union and France, which had fallen in arrears in their
payments because of their refusal to contribute to the peacekeeping Operations in the Congo
and the Middle East. The session is therefore not included in our study.
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A systematic analysis of leadership and group cohesion among the developing
nations can be based on their behavior in the UN General Assembly, because the
United Nations has always been an important instrument of their foreign policy.
This has particularly been the case since 1960, when they achieved a majority posi¬
tion within the Assembly. This position has enabled them to transform their policy
preferences into policy Outputs of the United Nations, even when the great powers
are opposed. This majority position had to be organized if it was to make effective
use of the United Nations at aU. Within this perspective, we can reformulate the
main object of our study as a systematic study ofthe degree to which the develop¬
ing nations acted as a group within the UN General Assembly; whether they did in¬
creasingly so over time and which delegations played an important role in this
group process.
Such a systematic study of group processes within the UN General Assembly re¬
quires a theoretical framework in which the concepts of group, leadership and co¬
hesion are related to the political process in the United Nations General Assembly.
Only then are we able to determine the functions that the group must perform to
realize its group goals.
In small group theories the concept group has a very broad meaning. Gibb, who
reviewed research on leadership in small groups, defined a group on the basis of
interaction of its members and common purposes or goals3 . In conformity with this
approach we shall speak of a group of delegations, if these delegations have com¬
mon purposes or goals and if they interact with each other to attain these goals.
Cohesiveness or cohesion of the group refers to the degree to which the members
of a group desire to remain in the group. It can be conceived as the resultant of all
forces acting on members to remain in the group4. If we apply this definition to the
United Nations, we can consider a group of delegations as cohesive to the extent
that they agree on the group goals, the group is seen as a necessary instrument to
reach the common goals and there is agreement with respect to the group functions,
or activities that help the group achieve its group goals. Leadership, then, is viewed
as the actual Performance of these group functions.
Given the above definitions the first step is to identify the group goals ofthe devel¬
oping nations at the time of our analysis. Socio-economic issues in the General As¬
sembly can be considered as related to the group goals of the developing nations as
as whole, because socio-economic problems have been the focus of the „Group of
77" since its beginning. The important subgroup of Afro-Asian countries, however,
has a broader value basis: colonial questions has been the other main issue area with
which this group was concerned from the beginning. Our analysis has therefore
been confined to the broad issue areas of colonial and socio-economic problems5.
Gibb, Cecil A., Leadership, in: Lindzey, Gardner, and Aronson, Elliot (eds.), The Handbook
of Social Psychology, vol. 4, 2nd ed., Reading/Mass. 1969, p. 207.
Cartwright, Dorwin, and Zander, Alwin (eds.), Group Dynamics Research and Theory, 3rd
ed., New York 1969, p. 91.
Colonial and socio-economic questions were defined by enumeration of five subject cate-
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Second, we must determine the group functions of the group of developing
nations within the Assembly. The United Nations can be considered a political Sys¬
tem, or more precisely, a political Subsystem in the international political system, in
which wants and demands are converted into authoritative aUocations6. By group
formation delegations are able to fix or change alternative aUocations or to deter¬
mine the outcomes ofthe aUocation process within the system. In other words, the
primary function of group formation among developing nations is the exercise of
political power and influence. Political power refers to the capacity to fix or change
(partly) a set of alternative aUocations for the members of a political system or a
part of it; political influence is the capacity to determine (partly) within a given set
of alternative value aUocations the outcomes of the allocation process . However,
political power and influence can be exercised in different phases of the political
process8. Group formation, leadership and cohesion among developing nations can
best be studied in that phase of the political process in which the developing
nations try to exercise the most political power and influence. That is the decision-
making phase. Thus, in their efforts to terminate colonial rule and to change their
peripheral position in the international economic system, the developing nations
have not been primarily oriented to prevention of decision-making in order to con¬
tinue the status quo, but rather to a positive decision-making by the General As¬
sembly.* This has in particular been the case since 1960, because of their majority
position within the Assembly. Since then they have had a very strong position in
the decision-making phase of the political process in the General Assembly and as a
consequence have directed their group efforts specifically to that phase and not to
earlier phases.
Exercise of political power and influence in the decision-making phase implies
that:
1) the developing nations should take initiative in the decision-making to formulate
their policy aims and to bring them to the floor;
gories: (1) trust territories and the Trusteeship Council; (2) non-selfgoveming territories in
Latin America (including the Carribean), Asia, Africa and Oceana; (3) right of seif determina¬
tion; (4) problems between (ex-)colonial powers and former colonies; and (5) socio-economic
problems (see Stokman, Roll calls).
Politics and authoritative aUocations are used here in a very broad sense. In this respect we
follow De Vree, who adopted Easton's definition of politics (Easton, David, A Systems Analysis
of Political Life, New York, 1965, p. 21) for use in the international setting (De Vree, J. D., Po¬
Utical Integration: The Formation of Theory and Its Problems, The Hague 1972, pp. 10 passim).
Mokken, R. J., and Stokman, F. N., Power and Influence as Political Phenomena, in: Barr,
Brian (ed.), Power and Political Theory: Some European Perspectives, New York 1976, p. 49;
Helmers, H. M., et aL, Graven naar macht. Op zoek naar de kern van de Nederlandse economie
(Traces of Power, in Dutch), Amsterdam 1975, p. 65.
Cf. particularly Bacharach, Peter, and Baratz, Morton S., Power and Poverty. Theory and
Practice, New York 1970; Van der Eijk, C, and Kok, W. J. P., Nondecisions Reconsidered, in:
Acta Politica, 10 (1975), pp. 277-301; Lukes, Steven, Power. A Radical View, London 1974.
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2) the developing nations should maintain a sufficiently high level of voting cohesion
to get their proposals adopted and to block undesired proposals.
These two conditions can be considered the essential group functions of the de¬
veloping nations and of important subgroups of developing nations within the
General Assembly. We can now ask whether the developmg nations managed to
satisfy these two conditions for the realization of therr power position in the deci
sion making phase of the Assembly and which developing nations contnbuted most
to this realization. In this paper we analyze only the Performance of the first group
function by the developing nations. For the analysis of the second group function
and the relation between the two group functions the reader is refened to Stokman
(1977 a).
Leadership will be indicated by sponsorship of resolutions, amendments and mo¬
tions within the selected issue areas A group, if it is to change the status quo, must
use resolutions to convert its policy preferences into United Nations decisions, parti¬
cularly if that group occupies a majonty position in the decision-making phase of
the General Assembly. Discussing the vanous Instruments of influence in the United
Nations pohtical system, Kay states that resolutions:
„
. . are viewed as the logical end toward which much of the activity of the Mem¬
ber States is directed. The activities of the permanent missions, the caucusing
groups, and the vanous organs of the United Nations aU bear the impnnt of this ul¬
timate »parhamentary test*
"10
However, sponsorship of proposals by a delegation can be used for other purposes
than goal achievement of the group(s) to which it belongs. Frequency of sponsor¬
ship may therefore not be used as an indicator of leadership in a group without
further evidence that sponsorship has indeed been used for goal achievement of the
group We solved this problem in two different ways First, initiative with respect to
common group goals is indicated on the basis of the network of co sponsorship re
lations, because co-sponsorship indicates at least compatible, but very often com¬
mon policy preferences between the co-sponsonng delegations A central position
of a delegation in this network of co-sponsorship relations between the developing
nations or groups within that group indicates that such a delegation participated
actively in the decision-makmg together with other group members The number of
proposals co-sponsored by a pair of delegations in that network indicates the extent
to which these delegations jointly exercised leadership over the ränge of group-goal-
One of the research aims of the larger study is a comparison of policy locations and leader¬
ship positions of delegations within the group. It required a research design in uhich selection
of roll caUs and proposals are closely related to each other Therefore we selected roll caUs con
cerning only those proposals that were sponsored by delegations and only those proposals that
in whole or in part were subjected to a roll caU vote. The sponsorship data were coded b> Bron
nernan Helmers, H. M., at that time assistant at the Institute for Pohtical Science, and Stokman
10
Kay, David A., The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967, New York 1970, p 41.
Mower, A. Glenn, The Sponsorship of Proposals in the United Nations General Assembly,
in Western Pohtical Quarterly, 15 (1962), p. 662, Kay, Nations, p. 41
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related issues. For the detection of different leadership dimensions that number of
co-sponsored proposals can therefore be used as a measure of similarity between
pairs of delegations. This approach will be followed in the next section. Even if we
would find a unidimensional Solution, it does not necessarily guarantee the existence
of one hierarchy of leadership. A one-dimensional Solution might well be reached,
because of the existence of different leadership Clusters with large intercluster
distances but smaU intracluster distances. If we find such an unidimensional Solu¬
tion, our second approach consists of a specification of a cumulative leadership mod¬
el. We shaU investigate whether there existed a hierarchy of leadership within a
group. Such a hierarchy implies active participation of certain delegations regarding
all group goals, i. e. general leadership. In the case of our sponsorship data we might
speak of one hierarchy of leadership in a group, if sponsorship is cumulative: leaders
in the group will Sponsor a large number of proposals over the whole ränge of
group-goal-related issues. „FoUowers" in the group are more reluctant to Sponsor
proposals; they only become involved, if proposals are rather salient to the group
goals. The more salient a proposal to the group goals, the more delegations wül co-
sponsor. If delegations lower in the hierarchy Sponsor a proposal, the leaders of the
group will also very likely be on the list of Sponsors. This approach wül be followed
in section 3. It should be noted that the two approaches are related to one another.
Delegations form a cumulative scale, a hierarchy of leadership, only if they have
more co-sponsorship relations with one another in the network of co-sponsorship
relations than expected in the case of random sponsorship. The scale analysis can
therefore be seen as a special analysis on the network of co-sponsorship relations12.
Group cohesion among the developing nations is associated with both group
functions. Here we only consider group cohesion with respect to the first group
function. It is denoted sponsorship cohesion. It is reflected in the structure of the
network of co-sponsorship relations among developing nations. If that co-sponsor¬
ship network contains different, mutuaUy unconnected or loosely connected cen¬
ters, it reflects a low degree of sponsorship cohesion. We then have different leader¬
ship dimensions among the developing nations. Another measure of sponsorship co¬
hesion is contained in the results of cumulative scaling of sponsorship. If all delega¬
tions of a group form one cumulative scale, one hierarchy of leadership, it indicates
a high degree of sponsorship cohesion; if the group is split over different negatively
correlated scales, it indicates low sponsorship cohesion.
12
Stokman, RoU call. See also Stokman, Frans N., Graph Theoretical Elaboration of Cumula¬
tive Scaling Techniques. This articie is reproduced in this volume.
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2. Co-Sponsorship Dimensions
For each period of analysis we can determine the different leadership dimensions
among developing nations by a multidimensional analysis of the matrix of co-
sponsorship relations among these nations. As we stated above, for each pair of de¬
veloping nations these matrices contain the number of co-sponsorship relations over
the selected proposals in a given period of analysis as a measure of simüarity. For
each of the periods the leadership dimensions could well be determined by a sepa¬
rate multidimensional analysis of the conesponding matrix. However, to interprete
the recurrence of the same dimensions and their importance in the different periods
as well as to circumvent interpretation problems in terms of rotation, reflection
etc., we shall apply a method of multidimensional scaling, which gives directly com¬
parable leadership dimensions over the different periods: INDSCAL (individual dif¬
ferences scaling).
The model assumes that different individuals perceive a set of n Stimuli in terms of
a common set of dimensions, but that these dimensions are differentiaüy important
or salient in the perception of different individuals13 . In our case we assume a com¬
mon set of leadership dimensions over the four periods of analysis, but these leader¬
ship dimensions are differentiaüy important or salient in the different periods of
analysis. In this application of the model the Stimuli are developing nations and the
individuals are periods of analysis. In the common or „group" space the coordinates
of the developing nations are given on the different leadership dimensions; for each
of the periods these leadership dimensions are weighted according to saliency of the
dimensions; these weighting factors are given in the „subject" space of the model14.
A first impression of the main leadership dimensions among developing nations
over the period 1950—68 can be obtained from the INDSCAL Solution over all four
Caroll, J. D., and Chang, J.J., Analysis of Differences in Multidimensional Scaling Via an N-
Way Generalization of „Eckart-Young" Decomposition, in: Psychometrica, 35 (1970), pp. 283
-319; Caroll, J. Douglas, Individual Differences and Multidimensional Scaling, in: Shepard,
Roger N., et al. (eds.), Multidimensional Scaling. Theory and Application in the Behavioral
Sciences, vol. 1, New York 1972, pp. 105-155.
One may question whether frequency of co-sponsorship is a good measure of similarity that
can be used for INDSCAL. Frequency of co-sponsorship between two delegations A and B is
dependent of the marginals (the frequency of sponsorship of the two delegations): it can not
exceed the frequency of sponsorship of the least active delegatioa Some researchers advocate
the use of a one-way measure of association (for example Yule's Q) as a measure of similarity to
avoid this dependency upon the marginals (Weisberg, Herbert F., Dimensional Analysis of Legis¬
lative Roll CaUs, Univ.Microfilms, Ann Arbor/Mich. 1968; MacRae jr., Duncan, Issues and Par¬
ties in Legislative Voting. Methods of Statistical Analysis, New York 1970). However, if we had
followed this approach, the similarity between two delegations would have been larger to the
degree that their sponsorship is more cumulative. This has nothing to do with leadership: spon¬
sorship between two delegations might well be perfectly cumulative, whereas they Sponsor only
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periods of analysis. Because the model requires the same set of Stimuli (developing
nations) over aU individuals (periods of analysis), this INDSCAL Solution is only
based on those developing nations, which were a member State of the United
Nations during the whole period 1950—68. This caused a drastic reduction of the
Afro-Asian nations in this analysis: besides 20 Latin-American countries, only 15
Afro-Asian nations (of which only 3 African nations) could be considered in this
analysis. In later analyses the new Afro-Asian member states wül also be taken into
consideration.
In Table 1 the twodimensional INDSCAL Solution over the four periods of ana¬
lysis is given. It accounts for 50 % of the variance in the data, which was not sub¬
stantiaUy less than for the three and four dimensional Solutions (respectively 54 %
and 57 %). On the basis of the weighting factors (Table 1 b) we see that the salien¬
cy of the first dimension steadily decreased from .58 to .11, whereas the saliency of
the second dimension steadüy increased from .22 to .74. On the first dimension of
the „group" space (Table 1 a) we see a number of Clusters of developing nations.
Most Latin-American delegations have positive coordinates, except for Guatemala,
Mexico and Bolivia; most Afro-Asian delegations have strongly negative coordinates,
but Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Liberia and Thailand have positive ones. This dimension is
particularly salient in the first period of analysis (1950—55). In that period parti¬
cularly Guatemala pursued an independent foreign policy untÜ the American inter-
vention in Guatemala in 1954, resulting in a coordinate on the first dimension close
to those of the main Afro-Asian countries. The positive coordinates of Yugoslavia
and the two more traditional African countries Ethiopia and Liberia in the period
1950—55 might be due to the fact that Afro-Asian group formations was not yet
a limited number of resolutions. In view of our theoretical objectives the best Solution would
probably have been the Jaccard index. If the cells in the two-by-two tabulation of sponsorship
by two delegations are denoted:
The Jaccard index is defined as follows:
b + c
a+b + c
Jaccard's index ignores the ceU d. It assumes that that cell does not contain information: similar-
ities of distances can only be based on the number of proposals, sponsored by at least one of
the two delegations. If neither delegation sponsored a resolution, that resolution does not con¬
tain information about the similarity of distance between the two delegations.
Wolters introduced this measure for the analysis of roll caUs in the Dutch parliament (Wolters,
Menno, The Unfolding of Roll-Calls and Thermometer Scores, Paper presented for the IPSA-
Congress at Edingburgh, 1976). In a later version of our paper we intend to perform the
INDSCAL analyses on this Jaccard index.
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very strong. Only the Arab countries already operated as a caususing group from
the beginning of the period. Moreover, Afro-Asian group formation at the end of
the period was primarily an Asian enterprise, at that time initiated by the main non-
aligned countries Burma, Ceylon, India and Indonesia, which were the main con-
Table 1: Two Dimensional INDSCAL Solution Over Four Periods of Analysis
a. coordinates of developing nations in the „group" space
dim. 1 dim. 2
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dom. Rep.
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
Yugoslavia
Ethiopia
Liberia
UAR
Afghanistan
Burma
India
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Pakistan
Philippines
Saudi Arabia
Thailand
Yemen
.0444 .1295
-.0193 .1561
.1028 .0850
.1066 .0672
.1320 .1384
.1352 .1574
.0782 .0789
.1159 .1755
.1450 .1296
.0198 .1999
-.1452 .1987
.0060 .1448
.1587 .1791
-.0029 .1189
.2095 .1545
.2630 .0869
.2251 .1431
.2546 .1377
.0382 .1503
.1391 .1086
.0828 -.2146
.1916 -.3010
.0716 -.2464
-.2286 -.2611
-.2183 -.2227
-.2486 -.1431
-.2016 -.2623
-.1531 -.1217
-.2323 -.2504
-.2469 -.1492
-.2158 -.1890
-.2437 -.0488
-.2474 -.1678
.0836 .0025
-.1998 -.1645
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b. weighting factors of the periods of analysis (coordinates in the „subject" space)
dim. 1 dim. 2
1950-55 .58 .22
1956-59 .22 .51
1960-63 .17 .64
1965-68 .11 .74
venors of the Bandung Conference in 1955. Yugoslavia and the African countries
became involved in Afro-Asian group formation at a later time. The second dimen¬
sion of the „group" Space gives a perfect split between Latin America and Afro-
Asia: aü Latin American delegations have positive coordinates on this dimension; all
Afro-Asian delegations (except Thaüand) have negative coordinates. The coordinates
on this second dimension are rather strongly correlated with those on the first di¬
mension (r = .60) because the main Latin American and Afro-Asian countries were
already splitted on the first dimension. Nevertheless, the increasing importance of
this dimension indicates, that over the 1950's and 1960's the split between Latin
America and Afro-Asia became more important, whereas separate leadership Clusters
whithin the two groups disappeared over time.
The conclusion that different leadership dimensions within Latin America and
Afro-Asia diminished in importance over the period 1950—68 was based on an ana¬
lysis over developing nations which were member states of the United Nations over
the whole period. In this analysis we could consider almost aU Latin American
countries, but only a small number of Afro-Asian delegations. This conclusion
should therefore particularly be substantiated for the Afro-Asian group, because o(
the large number of new Afro-Asian member states, which entered the United
Nations after 1950. We therefore performed a second INDSCAL analysis for 44
Afro-Asian delegations over the last two periods of analysis (1960—63 and 1965
Table 2: Two Dimensional INDSCAL Solution Over the Periods 1960-63 and 1965-68 for 44
Afro-Asian Delegations
a. coordinates of Afro-Asian nations in the „group** space
dim. 1 dim. 2
Cyprus
Yugoslavia
Cameroun
Central Afr. Rep.
Chad
Congo Brazz.
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-.0381 .1114
.1280 .2154
.0213 -.2231
-.0886 -.2859
-.0690 -.2252
.0326 -.2650
Congo Dem.
Dahomey
Ethiopia
Gabon
Ghana
Guinea
Ivory Coast
Liberia
Libya
Madagascar
Mali
Morocco
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Somalia
Sudan
Togo
Tunesia
UAR
Upper Volta
Afghanistan
Burma
Cambodia
Ceylon
India
Iran
Iraq
Jordan
Laos
Lebanon
Malaysia
Nepal
Pakistan
Philippines
Saudi Arabia
Thailand
Yemen
.0778 -.0585
.0178 -.2732
.0934 .1207
.2386 -.2486
.1392 .0425
.1555 .0264
.0127 -.2609
.0860 .0642
.0939 .0544
.0718 -.2380
.1496 .0276
.0954 .0660
.0754 -.2064
.1282 -.0034
.0472 -.1399
.1092 -.0111
.1430 .0448
.0932 -.1264
.1368 .0552
.1509 .0748
.0607 -.1810
.0585 .1075
-.2267 .1557
-.3863 .0865
.0091 .1156
.1269 .0810
-.0538 -.0118
.1227 .1012
.0206 .1634
-.4876 .0412
.0739 .2076
-.2428 .0618
-.0080 .1457
.0704 .1005
-.1757 -.0349
.0413 .1584
.3305 .1649
.0354 .1987
b. weighting factors of the periods of analysis (coordinates in the „subject** Space)
dim. 1 dim. 2
1960-63
1965-68
.32
.67
.61
.22
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—68). This analysis provides us the leadership dimensions within the Afro-Asian
group after the entrance of a large number of formerly French African member sta¬
tes in 1960. In Table 2 we give the two dimensional INDSCAL Solution over the
periods 1960—63 and 1965—68. It accounts for 49 % of the variance in the data.
On the basis of the weighting factors we see that the first dimension is particularly
salient in the period 1965—68, whereas the second dimension is particularly salient
in the period 1960—63 (see Table 2 b). The coordinates of the Afro-Asian delega¬
tions on the two dimensions in the „group" space are almost completely uncorrela¬
ted (r = .01). On the second leadership dimension most formerly French African
nations have negative coordinates, particularly the African nations of the so-called
Brazzaville group.
The Brazzaville group of African States got its name from the BrazzaviUe Con¬
ference in December 1960. This group consisted of twelve states, in essence French
Community States15. Mauritania, Algeria, and Congo were the main topics on the
series of Conferences between theses states. They favored Mauritanian membership
in the United Nations; rejected demands for a referendum in Algeria, but urged
France to enter negotiations with the F.L.N.; and supported a round-table Con¬
ference of the various political factions in the Congo. In the United Nations they
constituted an informal group from September 1960 untü September 196116. This
second leadership dimension is only important in the period 1960—63, because
African unity was reestablished in 1963 at the Conference of Addis Abeba, where
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was founded.
It is more difficult to interprete the first leadership dimension, without further
analyses. On the basis of the analyses, reported in the next section, we can however,
that this dimension is an activity dimension: the most actively Sponsoring Afro-
Asian delegations have high positive coordinates on this dimension, whereas the least
active delegations have strongly negative coordinates; this dimension distinguishes
the Afro-Asian leaders from the Afro-Asian foUowers (see particularly Table 6 in
Section 3). The exclusive prominence of this dimension in the period 1965—68 in¬
dicates that Afro-Asian sponsorship is unidimensional in the period 1965—68. It
substantiates our former conclusion that no distinct leadership Clusters exist within
the Afro-Asian group, even if we take into consideration the large number of new
Afro-Asian countries. Leadership among developing nations is indeed increasingly
organized along the Latin American/Afro-Asian leadership dimension, after a short
period in which controversies among newly independent African nations played an
important role. In the next section this will be corroborated by the analysis of
cumulative sponsorship dimensions among the developing nations. Moreover, that
method of analysis enables us to identify the leaders among the developing nations.
The BrazzaviUe group consisted of Cameroon, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta,
Madagascar, Mauritania, Gabon, Congo Brazzavüle, Chad, Central African Republic and Sene¬
gal. Mauritania was not a member State during the whole period 1960—63.
6
Hovet, Thomas, Africa and the UNO, Evenston/Ul. 1963, p. 91.
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3. Sponsorship Dimensions
A second possibility of detecting leadership dimensions among developing nations
consists of specification of a cumulative leadership model. The cumulative leader¬
ship model is based on the notion of the existence of one hierarchy of leadership
within a group. Wrhen do we speak of one leadership hierarchy within a group? We
can not speak of one hierarchy if there is a division of labour in the group, in which
one subgroup of delegations is active regarding a certain set of group goals, whereas
other subgroups are concerned with other sets of group goals. In such a Situation we
shaU probably discover several hierarchies of leadership, depending on the kind of
group goals we consider. This can be denoted as issue specific leadership within the
group. One hierarchy of leadership within a group implies active participation of cer¬
tain delegations regarding aU group goals, i. e. general leadership. Leaders in the
group are then active over a broad field of group goal related activities, whereas the
„foUowers** in the group become only involved, if more central group goals are con¬
cerned. In case of our sponsorship data we might speak of one hierarchy of leader¬
ship in a group, if sponsorship is cumulative: leaders in the group will Sponsor a
large number of proposals over the whole ränge of group related issues. The more
central a proposal is related to the group goals, the more delegations wül co-sponsor.
If delegations, lower in the hierarchy Sponsor a proposal, the leaders of the group
will also very likely be on the list of Sponsors. This model of a hierarchy of leader¬
ship is equivalent to a stochastic cumulative response model (a stochastic version of
the Guttman model), which was developed by Mokken17. The items in the model
of Mokken are here delegations. The respondents or subjects in the model of Mok¬
ken are now proposals1 . The trace line in the model of Mokken represents the
probabüity of a positive response by a subject to an item, whereas in our applica¬
tion a trace line represents the probabüity of sponsorship by a delegation. For our
analyses on hierarchies of leadership we can therefore apply the theory and proce¬
dures of scale analysis, as developed by Mokken.
We make only some remarks on these theory and procedures, referring the reader
to Mokken for more detailed information. For a hierarchy of delegations the frac¬
tions of the proposals, sponsored by a delegation, can be used for the ordering of
the delegations in the leadership hierarchy: the higher the fraction of sponsored
proposals, the higher the position in the hierarchy. This fraction is known as the
17
Mokken, R. J., A Theory and Procedure of Scale Analysis. With applications in political
research, The Hague 1970.
In our leadership model we reversed the active and passive set of the scaling model: respon¬
dents are here proposals; items are now delegations. In this way we directly get cumulative
scales of delegations (hierarchies of leadership). From another theoretical perspective the scal¬
ing model might be applied on this sponsorship data to get cumulative scales of proposals over
Sponsors. Delegations are then considered as respondents and proposals as items.
Theory, in particular chapter 2, 4 and 5.
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item difficulty. Here we see, that frequency ofsponsorship can be used to indicate
leadership in a group, if the data fit the cumulative leadership model. The proposals
can be given a score equal to the number of Sponsoring delegations. The order of
this score gives an ordering of the proposals relative to centrality to group goals.
For a hierarchy of k delegations, it can be proved that for all delegations i, j (i, j
= 1, 2,... k) the probabüity of co-sponsorship is higher than the probabüity expec¬
ted on the basis of random sponsorship: sponsorship of the different delegations in
a hierarchy of leadership is positively correlated. This implication ofa positive corre¬
lation was used by Mokken to define a criterion of scalability. Mokken used the
coefficient 0/(|)max as a measure of positive correlation between any pair of items
(delegations). For a scale as a whole, Loevinger's coefficient of homogeneity, H, is
used as a criterion of scalability in the sense of monotone homogeneity. H can be
written as a weighted function of th^/^tUax' tne H..'s, f°r au< item pairs. Mokken
also introduced an item coefficient H-, in terms of "Which the scalability of each
item (delegation) relative to the other items (delegations) can be evaluated. Hj can
also be written as a weighted function of the H^-coefficientsfCp/Cf^^) of that item
with all other items . A scale, in our case a hierarchy of leadership, is then defined
as follows: „a scale is a set ofitems which are all positively correlated and with the
property that every item coefficient of scalability (H-) is larger than or equal to a
given positive constant (c)"21. If all H* ^ c. Mokken suggested the following de¬
grees of scalabüity
a. .5 0 *^ H: a strong scale;
b. .40*^H < .50: a medium scale;
c. .30 < H < .40: a weak scale.
Thus, the coefficients H and H- indicate the degree of hierarchization and the ex¬
tent to which policy goals of the different nations overlap, whereas the frequency
of sponsorship of a delegation indicates leadership in a group, if the data fit the
cumulative leadership model.
On the basis of this theory of scale analysis Mokken proposed a class of scaling
procedures . One of these procedures consists of multiple scaling, the construction
of a number of scales from a given pool of items. The multiple scaling procedure
selects items (delegations) from a set of items (delegations) in such a way that the
scale coefficient H is maximized. If no other items can be added to a scale on the
basis of the chosen threshold level of the H and H- coefficient, a second scale is con¬
structed from the remaining items in the same way. This process is repeated until
no other scales can be found which satisfy the threshold level24.
20
Op. cit., pp. 150 passim.
21
Op.cit.,p. 184.
22
Op.cit., p. 185.
23
Op. cit., pp. 187-199.
For each period the analysis is performed over aU states, which were member State of the
United Nations during the whole period. However, delegations, which sponsored less than two
proposals in a period of analysis, were eliminated for that period. Their correlation coefficients
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Table 3: Cumulative Sponsorship Scales of Delegations; Period 1950—55
fraction of sponsored proposals
ö. Afro-Asian scale
Iran .04
Yemen .07
Saudi Arabia .10
Burma . 11
Pakistan .12
Indonesia .15
Syria .16
UAR .17
Iraq .18
coefficient of scalability for the whole scale H = .61
b. First Latin American scale
Nicaragua .01
Paraguay .02
Panama .02
Honduras .02
Costa Rica .04
Peru .05
Ecuador .09
Brazü .14
coefficient of scalability for the whole scale H = .70
c. Second Latin American scale
Bolivia .05
Mexico .07
Guatemala .10
coefficient of scalability for the whole scale H = .54
.89
.79
.67
.59
.56
.62
.54
.57
.54
1.00
.89
.87
.66
.62
.64
.62
.65
.57
.50
.54
In Table 3 the leadership hierarchies are given for the period 1950—55. The
three scales resulted from multiple scaling with a lowerbound of .50 for the item
coefficients Hj. Therefore, the three scales in Table 3 are strong scales. The Arab del¬
egations took an important position in the Afro-Asian hierarchy of 9 delegations
(H = .61). Iraq, the UAR and Syria were the three main leaders of the hierarchy,
Hj. can only be negative or one. By consequence, they were quite often selected as one of the
first items in the search procedure. This disturbed the results of the multiple scaling procedure.
Only scales of developing nations are reported.
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Sponsoring respectively 18, 17 and 16 percent of aU proposals. Burma and Indonesia
violated the requirement of double monotony: their trace lines intersect those of
the other delegations25 . It confirms that the hierarchy is in essence an Arab leader¬
ship hierarchy instead of an Afro-Asian one. If delegations with item coefficients
between .50 and .30 were aüowed, the 9 item scale became a scale of 15 delegations
(H = .51). All 15 delegations were Afro-Asian delegations. The leader in this larger
scale of 15 Afro-Asian delegations is now India, which sponsored 20 percent of all
proposals. We reported the 9 item strong scale in Table 3 instead of the hierarchy of
15' delegations, because there were many disturbances of the double monotony in
the larger scale. Only two Afro-Asian delegations were not contained in the larger
scale: Ethiopia was eliminated because it sponsored only one proposal in this period;
Yugoslavia did not scale with the other Afro-Asian delegations; Yugoslavia spon¬
sored 9 percent of aU proposals.
The results of the scale analysis confirms the low level of group formation
among the Afro-Asian delegations, which we already noticed in the previous sec¬
tion. The Arab countries already operated as a permanent caucusing group from
the beginning of the period. Only in the second half of the period India really
managed to organize an Afro-Asian group within and outside the United Nations
(Bandung Conference in 1955), of which it became one ofthe main leaders. Indeed,
the hierarchization of the Arab group, but not of the overall Afro-Asian group, was
strong enough to form a strong cumulative sponsorship scale. In terms of sponsor¬
ship India was the most active Afro-Asian delegation (it sponsored 20 percent of
the proposals), but at least during the first years of the period 1950—55 it was an
active Afro-Asian delegation without an effectively operating group of delegations
around it. v
In the period 1950—55 two Latin American hierarchies of leadership existed.
The first, dominant Latin American hierarchy (H = .70) consisted of 8 delegations.
Brazil is the leader; it sponsored 14 percent of all selected proposals. The hierarchy
can be extended to 11 delegations (H = .51), if also delegations with item coeffi¬
cients between .50 and .30 are allowed. Venezuela, Uruguay and Cuba are then add-
ed to the scale; they sponsored respectively 4, 6 and 11 percent of the proposals.
They disturb the requirement of double monotony and are therefore not acceptable.
The second Latin-American scale consisted of Bolivia, Mexico and Guatemala (H =
.54). At a lowerbound of .30 El Salvador and Yugoslavia were added. This resulted
in a week 5-item scale (H = .38). Sponsorship of delegations in the dominant Latin
American scale is completely independent of that in the Afro-Asian scale: the item
The cumulative scaling model does not only require that the trace lines increase monotonely
along the underlying continuum, but also that trace lines do not intersect, i. e. that the require¬
ment of double monotony or holomorphism is fulfilled. It does not specify the function of the
trace lines, however. If a set of items forms a scale following the criteria of scalabüity (a set of
delegations forms an hierarchy of leadership following these criteria), it is still possible that the
different trace lines intersect. This can be checked as described by Mokken (op. cit, pp. 180
-182).
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coefficients H* of the delegations in the dominant Latin American scale with
respect to the Afro-Asian scale ränge from —.09 to .15. It clearly shows that the
group goals of this dominant Latin-American group do not coincide with those of
the Afro-Asian delegations. This is not the case for the second Latin American
group. Sponsorship of these Latin American delegations is not quite independent
of that of the Afro-Asian delegations: 6 delegations of the Afro-Asian scale have
item coefficients of .30 or higher with respect to this second Latin American hier¬
archy. This second Latin American hierarchy is closer related to the Afro-Asian
scale than to the dominant Latin American scale: only one delegation of the domi¬
nant Latin American scale had an item coefficient of .30 or higher with the second
Latin American scale.
We conclude, that there existed three main leadership hierarchies among the
developing nations in the period 1950—55: one predominantly Arab group and two
Latin American groups. India was very active among the Afro-Asian delegations,
but in the first years of the period it had not yet organized the Afro-Asian group ef¬
fectively, Brazil and Ecuador were the leaders of the dominant Latin American
group. Sponsorship of this group was completely independent of that ofthe Afro-
Asian group. This group had therefore its own group goals, different from those of
the Afro-Asian group. Guatemala and Mexico are the two main delegations in the
second Latin American group. Untü the American Intervention in Guatemala in
1954, these two countries pursued an independent foreign policy. These results cor¬
respond remarkably well with the coordinates of the developing nations on the first
leadership dimension in the two dimensional INDSCAL Solution over the four
periods of analysis (see Table 1). As we stated above, that dimension was particular¬
ly salient in the period 1950—55.
To limit the size of this paper we do not extensively report the cumulative scales
of delegations in the period 1956—59, referring the reader to Stokman26. For a
comparison with the INDSCAL analyses we rather prefer to report the cumulative
scaling results of the periods 1960—63 and 1965—68, because of the Brazzaville
cluster in the period 1960—63 and the prominence of the Latin American/Afro-
Asian dimension in the period 1965—68. Multiple scaling of sponsorship in the
period 1956—59 showed the existence of a real strong Afro-Asian group under the
leadership of Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Burma, the main conveners of the Ban¬
dung Conference in 1955. The Western aligned Afro-Asian delegations however
formed a separate group or did not belong to any of the Afro-Asian groups. It indi¬
cates that in this period problems of nonalignment versus alignment in Cold War
had consequences for leadership positions and structures among developing nations
with respect to colonial and socio-economic issues. Group formation of Latin
American delegations was very weak with respect to these issues. As far as Latin
American groups existed, they took more pro-western than Afro-Asian policy posi¬
tions.
Stokman, Roll CaUs.
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In the period 1960—63 two main leadership hierarchies were found: an Afro-
Asian scale of 44 delegations (H = .64) and a Latin American scale of 8 delegations
(H - .60). Both scales are given in Tabel 4. They resulted from multiple scaling
with lowerbound level of Hj
= .50. Only three Afro-Asian delegations did not be-
long to the Afro-Asian hierarchy: the Phüippines, Thailand and Yugoslavia. The
Phüippines had an item coefficient H. = .497 with respect to this scale; in fact, it
can be considered as a member of the iiierarchy; it sponsored 15 percent of the pro¬
posals. Thailand and Yugoslavia had negative correlations with some other Afro-
Asian delegations. However, with the leaders of the Afro-Asian hierarchy both dele¬
gations had Hj- coefficients above .50. Yugoslavia and Thailand did not belong to
the Afro-Asian hierarchy, because they constituted different wings in this period.
This can be seen from the following multiple scaling results. Apart from the two
hierarchies reported in tabel 4, multiple scaling resulted in two other hierarchies.
The first one (with Thailand) consisted of Colombia, Chile, Thailand and the Phil¬
ippines (H = .61); the second one (with Yugoslavia) consisted of Czechoslovakia,
Haiti, Cuba and Yugoslavia (H = .75). We did not report these two scales as separate
hierarchies in Tabel 4, because aU leaders from Indonesia to Ghana (with only one
exception) and some other delegations had item coefficients above .50 with respect
to both scales. They can therefore not be considered as separate hierarchies. These
results strongly indicate general leadership in the Afro-Asian group with different
wings among the foUowers. The four most active delegations in the Afro-Asian hier¬
archy were four members of the Casablanca group. The Casablanca group of Afri¬
can states got its name from the Casablanca Conference, held in January 1961.
These African states
7
held more radical views on African issues and nonalignment
than the Brazzaville group. In the Congo crisis they all favored the Lumumba fac-
tion and demanded UN support for that faction. They declared their intention to
withdraw their troops from the ONUC. With respect to Mauritania they supported
the claim of Morocco, which considered Mauritania as a part of Great-Morocco. In
the United Nations about twelve formal meetings of the group were held between
January 1961 and November 196228.
In the selection procedure the former French African colonies were added to the
scale as the 31st to 43rd delegations in the scale. Only one other Afro-Asian delega¬
tion was added to the scale in a later step: Iran was added as the last delegation in
the hierarchy. The item coefficient of Upper Volta, which was added as the 3 Ist del¬
egation, was .59 at the moment of selection, but increased to .65 after selection of
Gabon as 43rd delegation. Also some other item coefficients of former French Afri¬
can colonies raised during the selection procedure. Most former French African col¬
onies systematicaUy violated the requirement of double monotony in the final hier¬
archy of 44 delegations. This is in particular the case for the delegations, which con¬
stituted the Brazzaville group. The increasing item coefficients and the disturbance
Guinea, Mali, Algeria, Morocco and the UAR. Algeria was not a member State of the United
Nations during the whole period 1960—63.
28
Hovet, Africa, p. 98.
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Table 4: Cumulative Sponsorship Scales of Delegations; Period 1960-63
fraction of
sponsored
proposals
H. fraction of
sponsored
proposals
H.
a. Afro-Asian scale
Laos .03
Turkey .03
Japan .03
Cyprus .08
Yemen .12
Gabon .12
Central African Rep. . 12
Madagascar .12.
Saudi Arabia .13
Lebanon .15
Dahomey .15
Congo-Brazzaville . 15
Iran .15
Jordan .16
Malaysia .16
Congo-Dem. Rep. .16
Ivory Coast .16
Cameroon .17
Cambodia .17
Chad .17
Upper Volta .18
Afghanistan .19
coefficient of scalability for the whole scale H = .64
b. Latin American scale
Costa Rica
Ecuador
Guatemala
El Salvador
Peru
Uruguay
Argentina
Brazil
coefficient of scalability for the whole scale H = .60.
.79 Pakistan
.48 Niger
.60 Togo
.59 Somalia
.54 Nepal
.54 Ceylon
.61 Burma
.59 Senegal
.58 Ethiopia
.55 Libya
.60 Liberia
.62 Tunesia
.52 Indonesia
.61 Sudan
.64 Mali
.60 India
.60 Iraq
.60 Nigeria
.63 Morocco
.58 Guinea
.65 UAR
.58 Ghana
.02 .60
.02 .55
.02 .70
.03 .54
.04 .52
.04 .68
.07 .56
.07 .62
.19 .55
.19 .66
.21 .60
.22 .69
.22 .57
.24 .66
.24 .60
.24 .65
.24 .62
.26 .69
.26 .60
.28 .59
.29 .69
.29 .66
.29 .73
.31 .69
.31 .69
.31 .72
.32 .77
.34 .76
.35 .78
.38 .81
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Table 5: Cumulative Sponsorship Scales of Delegation; Period 1956—68
fraction of H. fraction of H.
sponsored sponsored
i
proposals proposals
a. Afro-Asian scale
Laos .03 .79 Liberia .34 .52
Turkey .05 .65 Niger .34 .61
Singapore .08 .59 Burundi .35 .62
Gambia .08 .68 Uganda .35 .66
Burma .09 .59 Ethiopia .36 .65
Malaysia .10 .65 Morocco .36 .64
Thailand .11 .54 Tunesia .37 .65
Gabon .12 .59 Somalia .37 .60
Trinidad & Tobago .14 .54 Libya .37 .63
Mongolia .16 .65 Congo-Dem. Rep. .38 .65
Central African Rep. .19 .69 Togo .39 .63
Chad .20 .67 Sierra Leone .41 .65
Lebanon .21 .58 Pakistan .42 .62
Madagascar .24 .59 Sudan .42 .68
Iran .24 .50 Kenya .43 .73
Kuwait .25 .54 Mali .44 .67
Jordan .25 .59 Zambia .44 .66
Nepal .25 .58 Mauritania .44 .63
Cyprus .28 .65 Iraq .45 .63
Ivory Coast .28 .59 Nigeria .45 .74
Ceylon .29 .51 Yugoslavia .45 .60
Congo-Brazzaville .31 .59 Ghana .46 .71
Senegal .31 .60 India .47 .71
Dahomey .31 .65 Algeria .49 .74
Upper Volta .31 .54 UAR .50 .71
Rwanda .32 .59 Syria .51 .74
Cameroon .32 .60 Tanzania .52 .77
Afghanistan .34 .58 Guinea .53 .79
coefficient of scalabüity for the whole scale H = .63
b. Latin American scale
Paraguay .04 .91 Peru .08 .76
Brazil .05 .61 Costa Rica .09 .64
El Salvador .05 .89 Panama .09 .62
Honduras .06 .87 Venezuela .10 .72
Mexico .06 .57 Uruguay .10 .78
Bolivia .08 .75 Argentina .11 .74
Dominican Rep. .08 .67 Chile .11 .60
Guatemala .08 .82 Colombia .11 .78
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Haiti .08 .74 Ecuador
Nicaragua .08 .79
coefficient of scalabüity for the whole scale H = .74
.12 .79
in the double monotony can be attributed to the extremely high scalability among
the Brazzaville delegations: the 11 Brazzabüle delegations constituted a very strong
hierarchy with a coefficient of scalability H = .83. They constituted therefore a
group within the larger Afro-Asian group.
The second hierarchy in Table 4 is a strong scale of 8 Latin American delegations
(H = .60). The two largest Latin American countries are the leaders of this scale:
Brazil and Argentina. They were not very active, however: they sponsored only 7 per¬
cent of all proposals in this period, primarily regarding socio-economic issues. The
neutralist policy of President Goulart of Brazil from 1961 to 1964 did therefore not
result in a separate hierarchy of leadership, close to the Afro-Asian, as was the case
with Guatemala in the period 1950—55; it only resulted in a leadership position of
Brazü in the dominant Latin American group, which it lost again in the period 1965
to 1968, as we shall see. One may therefore question whether the foreign policy of
President Goulart was so neutralist as it pretended to be. At the Iowerbound level
of .30 only one other Latin American delegation could be added to this Latin Amer¬
ican scale, Haiti. None of the delegations in the Afro-Asian scale had an item coef¬
ficient above .26 with respect to this Latin American scale. Sponsorship of Latin
American delegations is therefore not related to primarily Afro-Asian proposals in
this period. It holds at most for Colombia, Chile, Haiti and Cuba, which were part
of the third and fourth scales. Thesmall number of proposals, which were sponsored
by these delegations, ranging from 2 to 5 percent of all proposals, make these con¬
clusions tentative, however.
We conclude, that in the period 1960 -63 the Afro-Asian delegations formed one
main hierarchy under the leadership of the Casablanca countries. Among the Afro-
Asian foUowers we can nevertheless distinguish three different wings: one consist¬
ing of Thailand and the Philippines; one consisting of Yugoslavia, and one consist¬
ing of the Brazzaville group. Among the Latin American countries there existed one
not very active hierarchy of 8 delegations under the leadership of Argentina and
Brazil, which was mainly concerned with socio-economic issues. This Latin Ameri¬
can group did not fit in the Afro-Asian hierarchy; it had its own group goals regard¬
ing colonial and socio-economics issues. This was not the case for four other Latin
American countries: Colombia and Chile belonged to the Afro-Asian wing consist¬
ing of Thailand and the Philippines; Haiti and Cuba belonged to the Yugoslavia-
wing in the Afro-Asian group.
The scale analysis in the period 1965-68 also gave very remarkable results. The
first hierarchy is an Afro-Asian scale, which consisted ot 56 delegations. The second
hierarchy is a Latin American scale of 19 delegations. Both hierarchies are strong
scales (see Table 5). The Afro-Asian hierarchy encompassed 53 delegations of the
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Afro-Asian caucusing group. The three other delegations are Turkey, Mongolia and
Trinidad and Tobago. Only 6 of the 59 Afro-Asian delegations were not contained
in this large Afro-Asian scale. Saudi Arabia (H = .49) and the Phüippines (Hj = .40)
were excluded. The four other Afro-Asian delegations had negative correlations
with some other Afro-Asian delegations in the scale. For this reason they were re¬
jected. These four delegations were Cambodia, Malawi, Maldive Islands and Yemen.
One of the most remarkable differences with the preceding period is the scalabil¬
ity of Yugoslavia. For the first time Yugoslavia is contained in the Afro-Asian scale.
It sponsored 45 percent of the proposals, which is considerably more than in the
preceding periods. Another striking difference between the third and fourth period
is the scalabüity of the Brazzaville group. In the period 1960—63 these delegations
disturbed the double monotony because they formed a subgroup within the larger
Afro-Asian hierarchy with a very high degree of hierarchization (H = .83). In the
period 1965—68 the coefficient of scalability of the Brazzaville group is not higher
than that of the whole Afro-Asian scale, namely H = .65.
The delegations ofthe Casablanca group still belonged to the leaders of the Afro-
Asian group, but the Afro-Asian center was extended with a number of other dele¬
gations, in particular Tanzania and Syria. For the first time we found one Latin
American hierarchy, which encompassed nearly the whole Latin American group.
Only three Latin American delegations were not contained in this scale: Cuba,
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago could be add¬
ed to the scale, if item coefficients between .50 and .30 were aUowed. Mexico and
to a lesser degree Chile systematicaUy disturbed the double monotony in the Latin
American scale. Sponsorship of Latin American delegations was quite independent
of that of Afro-Asian delegations. In this period sponsorship of Latin America and
Afro-Asia were even negatively correlated: most Afro-Asian leaders had strongly
negative item coefficients with respect to the Latin American scale.
We conclude, that in the period 1965—68 two main leadership hierarchies en¬
compassed nearly all developing nations: an Afro-Asian hierarchy encompassed al¬
most aU Afro-Asian delegations, a Latin American one almost all Latin American
delegations. It was for the first time that the Latin American delegations operated
as one group with respect to colonial and socio-economic issues. It was also for the
first time, that sponsorship of Latin American delegations was negatively correlated
with that of the Afro-Asian delegations. These developments might well be the result
of the same developments in Latin America, which led to the ,,Group of 77". The
common economic problems of the Latin American countries in the 1960's rein-
forced a group process among the Latin American countries with respect to these
socio-economic problems resulting in a more encompassing group and at the same
time more clearly defined Latin American group goals. The similarity of the econo¬
mic problems between Latin America and Afro-Asia in many respects led to the for¬
mation of the ,,Group of 77" as a coalition of these two groups. This further stimu¬
lated group processes within Latin America in this field: only as a distinct, well
organized subgroup could the Latin American countries be sure to get the necessary
priorities for their own policy preferences within the „Group of 77". The strongly
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regional character of the ,,Group of 77" also presumed a distinct Latin American
group. The fact that the Latin American hierarchy was particularly active with
respect to socio-economic issues can be seen as a further corroboration of this inter¬
pretation of Latin American group processes at that time. In each case the results of
the scale analyses clearly demonstrate that the „Group of 77" must be seen as a
coalition between two separate groups: the Latin American group and the Afro-
Asian group.
4. Conclusions
We conclude, that over the 1950's and 1960's co-sponsorship among developing
nations was structured along one underlying dimension. Over time this underlying
dimension took on increasingly the character of a split between Latin American on
the one hand and Afro-Asia on the other: different leadership Clusters within these
two important subgroups graduaüy disappeared. In Latin America this was the case
with Guatemala and Mexico, which foUowed a policy close to that ofthe main Afro-
Asian delegations in the period 1950—55; in Afro-Asia it holds in particular for
Yugoslavia and the Brazzaville group, which no longer existed as separate Afro-
Asian leadership Clusters in the period 1965—68.
Analysis of sponsorship showed that in each period the underlying co-sponsor¬
ship dimension consisted of different leadership hierarchies. These leadership hier¬
archies coincided with the different Clusters of delegations on the underlying co-
sponsorship dimension. It enabled us to identify the leaders in the different leader¬
ship hierarchies and it substantiated our conclusion that leadership among develop¬
ing nations was increasingly organized into two subgroups: Latin America and Afro-
Asia.
The separate Afro-Asian and Latin American leadership hierarchies in the period
1965—68 reflect the importance of the regional groups in the decision-making in
the ,,Group of 77". Gosovic distinguished three regional groups: Latin America,
Africa and Asia. In UNCTAD's main bodies (Conference and Board) even the smaü-
est proposals were referred to these regional groups for clearance . Our results
suggest, however, that the relations between the Asian and the African regional
groups were quite different from those between Latin America on the one hand and
the African and Asian groups on the other hand. At least in the General Assembly,
the African and the Asian groups operated as one group, whereas the Latin Ameri¬
can delegations stül behaved as a separate group within the „Group of 77", as far as
their behavior in sponsorship is concerned.
29
Gosovic, Branislaw, UNCTAD. Conflict and Compromise. The third world's quest for an
equitable world economic order through the United Nations, Leyden 1972, p. 206—7.
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